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Recent years have seen countries introducing reform of their utility industries with a 
view to promoting private ownership and competition. This paper studies the effect of 
the sequencing of privatisation, competition and regulation reforms in electricity 
generation using data from 25 developing countries for the period 1985 to 2001. A 
fixed effects panel data model is used. The study finds that establishing an 
independent regulatory authority and introducing competition before privatisation is 
correlated with higher electricity generation, higher generation capacity and, in the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Spurred by political, technological and institutional changes, countries around the 
world have undertaken reform and restructuring in their infrastructure industries over 
the last two decades. Privatisation and regulatory reform have been adopted as the 
solution to the problem of poor performance by formerly state-owned incumbents, 
and as the means to achieve improved services and lower prices. In order to stimulate 
allocative and productive efficiency, competition has been introduced to activities 
where the notion of ‘natural monopoly’ has been rejected. While it may be the case 
that each of the reforms – privatisation, regulation and competition – is desirable 
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Martin and Parker, 1997; Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005), 
there is rarely a country that has felt able to introduce all three measures 
simultaneously. An important question for policy, therefore is whether there is an 
optimal sequencing of the reforms. For example, should privatisation occur before or 
after the establishment of a regulatory system or before or after the introduction of 
competition?   
 
Sitiglitz (2002, p.18) writes in relation to economic development that ‘successful 
economic programs require extreme care in sequencing – the order in which reforms 
occur’ (emphasis in the original).The issue of reform sequencing in developing 
countries has been extensively debated in the context of both trade and financial 
liberalisation. The concentration of  structural adjustment programmes  on trade 
liberalisation fostered considerable discussion of the optimal sequencing of   tariff 
reductions   and the removal of  quota protection measures in affecting the impact of 
liberalisation on economic performance ( Kirkpatrick 1995; Kirkpatrick and Weiss,   4
1995). In the 1990s the premature liberalisation of international capital movements in 
the context of a weak  domestic financial regulatory framework  was a major 
contributory factor in the financial crises that affected many Asian and other 
developing countries in the latter half of the decade ( Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 
1999, 2000). 
 
In contrast, debate on the sequencing of privatisation and regulation has been 
confined until recently, to the transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Reform sequencing has been debated from the late 1980s when the former communist 
countries  began their transition to market economies. Fast and large-scale 
privatisation programmes were adopted by a number of these countries but often 
appeared to fail to produce the intended results in terms of quick economic 
performance improvement (Filatotchev, 2003; Hare and Muravyev, 2003). 
Researchers (e.g. Fershtman, 1989; Dewatripont and Roland, 1992; Roland, 1994; 
Hirschhausen and Opitz, 2001) then argued for gradualism, which emphasised the 
importance of first establishing institutional infrastructures conducive to market 
exchange, including competitive industrial structures and appropriate regulatory 
systems. This debate was mirrored in the 1990s by growing evidence from the 
industrialised Western economies, including the UK, that privatisation alone was 
insufficient to stimulate performance improvement, especially in the public utilities 
with their natural monopoly characteristics (e.g. Martin and Parker, 1997). 
 
In spite of the perceived importance of managing the reform process effectively and 
paying attention to the establishment of competition and regulation, there remains a 
paucity of study of the appropriate sequencing of reforms in utility sectors in   5
developing economies. The only studies that have looked at this issue in detail are 
based on data from telecommunications (Wallsten, 2002; Fink et al., 2002), the sector 
where the wave of reform first began and has been the most extensive. No 
econometric work appears to have been undertaken to test the effects of reform 
sequencing in the electricity power sector. This is probably because of a lack of 
consistent data for this sector (compared to telecommunications where the 
International Telecommunications Union and now the World Bank in conjunction 
with Stanford University have collected considerable data) and partly because of the 
difficulty in accurately assessing the various reforms adopted by different countries. 
In this paper we attempt to address this gap in knowledge by testing for the effects of 
sequencing between privatisation, competition and regulation in the electricity-
generation sector. Based on a panel dataset covering 25 developing countries for the 
period 1985 to 2001, this study finds that establishing an independent regulatory 
authority and introducing competition before privatisation is correlated with higher 
electricity generation, higher generation capacity and, in the case of the sequence 
between privatisation and competition, improved capital utilisation. An earlier paper 
(Zhang et al., 2002) used a larger data set involving 51 developing countries over the 
period from 1985 to 2000. This study found that competition was more important than 
privatisation in raising economic performance in electricity generation, but did not 
consider the role of sequencing. The current paper uses a subset of this data to test for 
sequencing effects with the data cross-checked against information published on the 
World Bank’s web site, where there are overlaps.
1 This means that the research 
focuses on those countries where reforms to their electricity sector have occurred and 
the necessary data are available on privatisation, competition and regulation. This 
                                                 
1 World Bank (2004a), Electricity Regulation Database,   6
may admittedly introduce some sample bias because the countries included are likely 
to be those that have introduced some of the most significant reforms to their 
electricity sectors. The results might not hold for other countries. Also, no developed 
economies are included in the data set and future research is needed to assess whether 
our results are robust across economies at different levels of development.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents background information on 
electricity reform. Section 3 provides a review of relevant empirical and theoretical 
studies on competition, regulation and privatisation, from which the research 
hypotheses are developed. Data issues and modelling are presented in Section 4. The 
following section discusses the results and Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  Background 
 
Network infrastructure industries have traditionally been viewed as strategically 
important activities with ‘natural monopoly’ characteristics (Sharkey, 1982; 
Armstrong et al., 1994). Due to the existence of economies of scale and scope, it was 
believed that efficiency gains could be obtained by strictly limiting the number of 
operators, often to one. Because of the importance of the products and services 
involved, the resulting monopolies in these industries were usually owned by 
government. However, over the last two decades the inevitable existence of ‘natural 
monopoly’ has been rejected for at least some of the activities of the public utilities, 
including electricity generation. One factor that has contributed to this shift in belief 
                                                                                                                                            
http://econ.worldbank.org/resource.php?type=18. Eight of our 25 countries also appear in this data base   7
has been changes in technology. But also budgetary pressures, the preferences of 
donor agencies such as the World Bank and the perceived poor performance of state-
owned firms in terms of costs of production, service quality and service expansion, 
have led more and more governments to turn to private investors for solutions (Bacon, 
1995; World Bank, 1995; Spiller and Martorell, 1996; World Energy Council, 1998).  
 
The earliest reforms in the utilities occurred in telecommunications and much 
research has focused on this sector (e.g. Noll, 2000; Wallsten, 2001; Li and Xu; 2002; 
Gutierrez, 2003). More recently, electricity power has been included in the reform 
process (Joskow, 1998). In summary, reforms in the electric power sector have 
involved ‘unbundling’ or vertically separating the industry into generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply activities, privatisation, introducing competition 
and establishing more formal and sometimes ‘independent’ regulatory agencies 
(Newbery, 1999; Parker, 2003). However, by no means all countries have adopted all 
of these changes; indeed, in most countries state ownership remains dominant, 
regulation remains largely untested, and competition is still restricted.  
 
Nevertheless, with advances in technology, especially in electricity generation in the 
form of combined heat and power plants and combined-cycle gas turbine generation, 
and in the computing systems used to meter and dispatch power, the importance of 
economies of scale have diminished. Competition has been introduced into the 
generation and sometimes supply sub-sectors, which are now believed to be subject to 
increasing marginal costs. It is also expected that entities under dispersed ownership 
will facilitate competition and that privatising unbundled generators and suppliers will 
                                                                                                                                            
so in these cases it was possible to cross-check the dates of institutional reform.   8
introduce badly needed new financial resources and management expertise (Parker, 
2003). As a result, privatisation of electricity power has spread across the developed 
economies and many developing ones. More than 600 private electricity projects, 
accounting for investment of US$ 160bn reached financial closure in 70 developing 
countries during the 1990s (Izaguirre, 2000, p.5).
2 The projects were implemented 
under schemes ranging from management contracts, to divestitures of state assets, to 
greenfield facilities under build-operate-own (BOO), build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
and build-operate-own-transfer (BOOT) schemes,  
 
Latin America, East Asia and the Pacific and the Caribbean have absorbed the lion’s 
share of the investment in projects with private participation, accounting for more 
than 60% of the total capital invested (Izaguirre, 1998, p.3). In Latin America and the 
Caribbean privatisation mainly took the effect of transferring existing, state-owned 
generation to the private sector and private participation has occurred mainly in the 
context of wider reforms involving vertical separation of the electricity sector. By 
contrast, in Asia privatisation has been associated more with new, greenfield 
investments in the form of independent power producers (IPPs) established under 
various forms of franchises and contracts. Both approaches have been used in Africa 
and the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
As in other public-utility sectors undergoing reform, developing a new regulatory 
structure so as to provide more certainty for private investors has been an important 
part of the reform process in the electric power sector (Kessides, 2004). In order to 
attract private capital and signal to the incumbents being privatised that they will not 
                                                 
2 The World Bank (2004, Table 1.1, p.33) estimates the figure for private investment in electricity in   9
be subject to arbitrary political interference, the development and establishment of a 
credible and effective regulatory regime has become a recognised feature of the 
reform process in more and more countries (Cook, 1999; Commander and Killick, 
2000). Gutierrez and Berg (2000) identify the importance of effective regulatory 
governance in achieving performance improvements in Latin American 
telecommunications. ‘Independent’ or quasi-independent regulatory bodies, in the 
forms of offices, agencies and commissions, have been set up, with the expectation 
that private capital will only be forthcoming to the desired levels if a high degree of 
regulatory transparency, consistency and accountability exists (Spiller, 1996; Schmitz, 
2001; Parker, 2002). Another aspect of independent regulation is the protection of 
consumers from monopoly abuse. This kind of protection is especially desirable in 
industries such as electricity supply that may still be dominated by a state-owned 
incumbent or by a privatised monopoly. Also, a number of studies have underlined 
the complexity of electricity sector reform (Hunt and Shuttleworth, 1996; Steiner, 
2000; ed. Hodge et al., 2004). Unbundling the industry into a number of separate 
generation, transmission and distribution companies risks reducing economies of scale 
and scope, and raising transaction costs because legal contracts replace direct 
management control of the supply chain (Joskow, 2002). Equally, electricity 
production is associated with various environmental concerns and power producers 
may be reliant on fuel inputs subject to fluctuating prices. For these reasons, 




                                                                                                                                            
both developing and transition economies at US$213.4bn. between 1990 and 2001.   10
3.  Literature Review and the Research Hypotheses 
 
In the early 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe, the unprecedented, radical 
reconstruction of economies spurred debate as to the proper way of proceeding. Many 
influential researchers (e.g. Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1991; Lipton and Sachs, 1990; 
Blanchard et al., 1991) recommended a ‘big bang’ approach, which favoured mass 
privatisation. This approach to privatisation emphasised speed, leaving the task of 
restructuring to the owners of the privatised firms and of establishing the necessary 
market and legal institutions to subsequent governments. Advocates of mass 
privatisation seem to have believed that, once private property rights existed, 
incentive problems within firms would be solved and competition and other 
institutional reforms would inevitably follow. Quick privatisation was also favoured 
with the objective of reducing state power and the opportunity for a resurrection of 
communism (Boycko, et al. 1992).  
 
However, some economists (e.g. Roland, 1994; Summers, 1994) expressed concerns, 
warning that political constraints and other institutional deficiencies, such as an 
effective legal system, necessitated a more gradual approach to reform in the 
transition economies. They argued that privatising without first establishing the 
effective institutional infrastructures required if private investment is to flourish 
risked failure (Roland, 1994; Steinfeld, 1998). Neglecting the institutional 
environment as a pre-condition for successful privatisation would damage the 
emergence of an effective private financial sector and prevent a gradual ‘hardening’ 
of budget constraints (Roland, 1994; Zhang, 2002). The debate on the appropriate   11
speed of reform has drawn attention to the importance of the appropriate sequencing 
within reform programmes.  
 
Turning to utilities industries specifically, there has been a broad belief that 
privatisation is the key to performance improvement (Lalor and Garcia, 1996; 
Megginson and Netter, 2001) and the introduction of competition and effective 
regulation has sometimes been neglected (Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005). In many 
countries incumbents in the electric power sector, as well as in other infrastructure 
industries, have been privatised although the institutional framework necessary for the 
market to function well has been lacking (Spiller, 1993; Cook, 1999; Bitran and Serra, 
1998; Lalor and Garcia, 1996; Spiller and Martorell, 1996). Compared to the speed of 
privatisation in utilities sectors, the process of establishing a new regulatory regime 
has tended to be slower. Furthermore, the development of effective regulatory 
structures has, especially in developing countries, been constrained by the capacity of 
governments to enforce regulatory rules and monitor contracts (ed. Levy and Spiller, 
1996). The result is that, with limited numbers of operators and a weak regulatory 
framework, many privatised companies have retained considerable monopoly powers. 
At the same time, both the theoretical and empirical literatures have pointed to the 
importance of competition in raising economic efficiency when privatisation occurs 
(e.g. Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Bouin and Michalet, 1991; Martin and Parker, 1997; 
Kleit and Terrell, 2001; Martin and Vansteenkiste, 2001). As Ambrose et al. (1990) 
note, simply changing the ownership of a monopoly from public to private will not 
lead to competitive behaviour. Newbery (1991) suggests that privatising monopolies 
could be problematic in terms of raising efficiency and has called for the introduction 
of competition.    12
 
In public utility sectors investors in privatised firms naturally have a strong preference 
for maintaining their economic rents and can be expected to lobby against speedy 
market liberalisation. In a number of cases, a monopoly status for certain duration has 
been promised by governments to private investors as a means of encouraging 
adequate private capital to ensure a successful privatisation (Guasch, 2004). However, 
in an environment lacking competition, an effective regulatory regime is important to 
protect consumers. Economic regulation can remove or at least reduce the anti-
competitive effects of market dominance. Cook (1999) provides case studies of utility 
reform in developing economies and finds that regulation rather than privatisation has 
achieved the largest gains. There is also evidence in the study that, among a variety of 
reform measures introduced, the most tangible benefits, especially those to 
consumers, resulted from the establishment of competition.  
 
Galal and Nauriyal (1995) have compared the pre- and post-privatisation performance 
of the telecommunications industry in seven developing countries. They find that 
countries that solved three regulatory issues, namely incentives, information and 
commitment, achieved greater improvement than those that failed to do so. In an 
empirical study of telecommunications in 30 African and Latin American countries, 
Wallsten (2001) reported that privatisation, on its own, was not associated with 
efficiency improvements and needed to be combined with building regulatory 
capacity. Similarly, studying performance in telecommunications in 22 Latin 
American countries between 1980 and 1997, Gutierrez (2003) finds that sound 
regulatory governance has a positive effect on network expansion and efficiency and   13
competition and divestment by the incumbent operators contributes positively to 
sector performance.  
 
For the electricity sector, Zelner and Henisz (2000) and Bacon and Besant-Jones 
(2001) identify the importance of political and institutional variables in determining 
the pace of reform and new investment (also see Ruffin, 2003); while Bortolotti et al. 
(1999) conclude that effective regulation is a crucial institutional variable in 
electricity privatisation. Regulation is important because it helps speed up successful 
privatisations and affects the proceeds obtained.  Using data from electricity industries 
in 19 OECD countries from 1987 to 1996 to test for the effects of privatisation, 
competition and regulation, Steiner (2000) provides mixed results but some evidence 
of higher capacity utilisation with private ownership and industry unbundling. 
Industrial consumers appear to have benefited most in terms of price reductions 
following reforms. But Plane (1999) in a study of one privatisation, that of the Côte 
d’Ivoire Electricity Company, and using parametric and non-parametric tests, reports 
much less significant performance improvements after privatisation, involving price 
reductions and improved services. By contrast, studies of electricity reforms in Latin 
America have tended to reveal efficiency improvements especially in terms of labour 
productivity, capacity utilisation and energy losses and overall social welfare gains 
(Delfino and Casarin, 2001; Paredes, 2001; Ennis and Pinto, 2002; Fisher, Gutierrez 
and Serra, 2003; Torero and Pascó-Font, 2003). Even lower income groups may have 
benefited, despite reductions in price subsidies, through improved access to electricity 
supplies. However, there is also evidence of problems including contact cancellations 
and renegotiations (Guasch, 2004) and capture of welfare gains by government 
through higher taxes (Estache et al., 2003), once again confirming the complexity of   14
electricity reform.  Zhang et al. (2002) assess the effects of competition, privatisation 
and regulation on performance in electricity generation in 51 developing countries 
between 1985 and 2000 and find that it is the introduction of competition rather than 
ownership change that is most likely to bring about performance gains. Evidence in 
this study also confirms that the co-existence of privatisation and an independent 
regulator leads to greater electricity availability, more generation capacity and higher 
labour productivity. Finally, Estache et al. (2004) rank the efficiency of 84 South 
American electricity utilities between 1994 and 2001 using both data envelopment 
analysis and a stochastic cost frontier model,. However, they do not comment 
specifically on the separate effects of competition, regulation and privatisation.
3 
 
However, none of these studies considered in any detail, if at all, whether the order 
and timing of reforms is important. To date the studies that have empirically assessed 
the significance of sequencing have focused only on the telecommunications sector. 
Using data for telecommunications from 197 countries for the period 1985-1999, 
Wallsten (2002) tested whether the order between regulatory reform and privatisation 
mattered. He found that establishing separate regulatory authorities prior to 
privatisation was positively correlated with investment and telephone penetration. In a 
study sponsored by the World Bank, Fink et al. (2002) concluded that mainline 
penetration in years following the simultaneous introduction of competition and 
privatisation was significantly higher than when privatisation occurred before 
competition. They also found evidence of the beneficial effects of having an 
independent regulator. 
                                                 
3 Other studies of the electricity sector but less relevant to our study because they relate solely to 
developed economies are those by Arocena and Waddams-Price (1999), dealing with performance 
under different regulatory regimes in Spain; Hattori (1999, 2002), who studies the impact of regulatory   15
 
In this paper we attempt to assess the impact of the sequencing of privatisation, 
regulation and competition in the electricity generation sectors of 25 developing 
countries using a data base especially developed for the purpose of researching market 
liberalisation, regulation and privatisation policies in such economies. Ideally, the 
research would also encompass the effects of reform sequencing in the electricity 
transmission and distribution, but it did not prove possible to obtain the necessary 
data. This is not be a serious limitation of the study, however, because most of the 
private capital introduced into the electricity sector in developing countries has gone 
into generation. Of the privatisation projects in electricity in developing countries in 
recent years, 73% have involved the construction of power generation plants 
(Izaguirre, 1988, p.4).  
 
Two sets of hypotheses are tested regarding (1) the order between privatisation and 
competition, and (2) between privatisation and regulation. As suggested by some of 
the literature reviewed above, privatising monopolies may provide incumbents with 
only limited incentives to improve performance because there is still scope for 
controlling output and because of the management’s monopoly of information. Under 
competition, however, firms must produce efficiently in order to survive. When an 
incumbent utility is privatised, the existence of competition helps eliminate the 
remaining scope for managerial slack and the incentive under conditions of monopoly 
to restrict output below the competitive level. From such arguments, we derive our 
first hypothesis: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
reforms on the electricity sector in Japan and the US; and Newbery and Pollitt (1997) and Domah and   16
  Hypothesis 1:  the introduction of competition prior to the privatisation of 
  electricity generation will yield a greater  improvement in output, capacity 
  utilisation and  productivity performance. 
 
An incumbent monopolist in the electricity-generating sector faces both the incentive 
and often the means to prevent competition. While competition is technically possible 
in electricity generation, new entrants may have to surmount large obstacles to gain a 
foothold in the market. Increasing the number of electricity generators can prove 
difficult. Introducing an effective regulatory framework before privatising electricity 
generation, including encouraging greenfield investments, may therefore help reduce 
the anti-competitive effects of dominance. The regulator can attempt to achieve a 
‘level playing field’ so that competition develops, for example by ensuring access at 
‘fair’ prices to existing transmission and distribution grids. 
 
Based on such considerations we propose a second hypothesis:  
 
  Hypothesis 2: that establishing an independent regulator prior to the 
  privatisation of electricity generation will yield a greater improvement in 
  output, capacity utilisation and productivity performance. 
 
The hypothesised improvements in performance will result from gains in both 
productive and allocative efficiency. Changes in productive efficiency can be proxied 
by measures of capital and labour input use. For the measurement of  allocative 
efficiency gains we rely on changes in output or potential output through increased 
                                                                                                                                            
Pollitt (2001) who consider electricity sector reform in the UK.   17
generating capacity. Admittedly this measurement of allocative efficiency is crude, 
but unfortunately data limitations prevent a closer measurement of the price-cost 
wedge in electricity generation in developing countries. Also, a lack of data ruled out 
testing for the effects of competition, regulation and privatisation on service quality. 
 
 
4.  Data and Modelling 
 
The above hypotheses were tested using a panel dataset of 25 developing countries 
which had privatised electricity generation in the period from 1985 to 2001. The 
starting date for the study, 1985, was dictated by data availability; although this is not 
a problem because little reform of the electricity sector in developing countries 
occurred before this date. The final date, 2001, represented the last year for which 
data were available at the time the research was conducted. The choice of the sample 
countries was based on access to data and the countries included are listed in Table 1, 
along with information on the dates used in the study for privatisation and the 
introduction of competition and an industry regulator where relevant. The countries 
are drawn from Latin American and the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. 
 
(Table 1 here) 
 
 The primary performance indicators used in the study as dependent variables are net 
electricity generation per capita, installed generation capacity per capita, electricity 
generation to average capacity (the capacity utilisation rate) and net generation per 
employee (labour productivity). The data on electricity generation and generation   18
capacity came from the database of APERC (Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre) 
and the data on population from World Development Indicators published by the 
World Bank.  The employment data used to compute labour efficiency were compiled 
from the Industrial Statistics Yearbook (various years) and the database of the 
International Labour Organisation. Ideally, the labour input would reflect both the 
quantity and quality of the labour force. Unfortunately, international data on labour 
quality in electricity generation are not available. In common with a number of other 
studies (e.g, Estache et al., 2004) we use the number of employees as the labour input 
but also include GDP per capita as an environmental variable to, in part, proxy skill 
distributions across countries (ibid., p.275).
4 Labour productivity and capacity 
utilisation rate are used as proxies for productive efficiency, and electricity generation 
per capita and installed capacity per capita as proxies for allocative efficiency. 
Information on privatisation, competition, regulation and sequencing were constructed 
from information in The Yearbook of Privatisation (various years), Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) publications, World Energy Council (WEC) and 
APERC online publications and the government websites of various countries. The 
data were cross-checked, where possible, with data published by the World Bank.
5 
 
There was insufficient, consistent information on the percentage of electricity 
produced by private companies or the percentage of generation capital owned by 
private investors to permit a measurement of ownership according to differing levels 
of state control. Instead, three different dummy variables for privatisation in 
electricity were used, namely: (1) representing whether there was any privatisation in 
the electricity sector within a country; (2) whether any privatisation had occurred in 
                                                 
4 The logic is that where quality differences exist, when GDP per capita is higher there will be fewer   19
electricity generation; and (3) whether there was any private involvement in 
electricity provision including the introduction of IPPs (independent power 
producers). As the regression results were similar for the alternative dummies, we 
simply report below the results using the dummy for privatisation in generation.
6 The 
dummy takes the value of 1 beginning the year when some privatisation in generation 
occurs, even if only partial. Similarly, because of the unavailability of concentration 
ratio data or similar for the electricity generation sector in the sample of countries, 
competition was measured by a dummy variable that equalled 1 either when a 
wholesale market for electricity was introduced or generators were first allowed to 
compete to conclude supply contracts with distributors or large users. Measuring 
regulatory effectiveness is always problematic (Domah, Pollitt and Stern, 2002) and 
particular difficulties arose in measuring regulation for the purposes of this study. 
Limited published information on the effectiveness of regulation adopted in particular 
developing countries prevented the construction of a multi-dimensional measurement 
of regulation that reflected differing degrees of regulatory impact. The measure used 
was a dummy variable to indicate whether a country claimed to have an electricity 
regulatory agency not directly under the control of a ministry.
7 For convenience this is 
described as ‘independent regulation’, although the degree of independence from 
government can be quite limited in practice. The regulation dummy takes the value of 
1 beginning from the year the regulator was established. The limitations of the reform 
                                                                                                                                            
units of labour input needed to attain a given production level. 
5 See footnote 1 above. 
6 The alternative results can be obtained from the authors. In the results reported the introduction of 
IPPs only is not classified as privatisation. This is sensible since the use of IPPs may not signal 
anything significant about the degree of state control of the electricity sector. 
7 There were two countries in our sample where changes to regulation, competition and privatisation 
occurred in the same year and three countries where regulation and privatisation were introduced in the 
same year. Therefore, for most of our sample, reforms to regulation, competition and privatisation 
occurred sequentially.   20
variables should be born in mind when interpreting the results, something we return to 
in the conclusions. 
 
Two sequencing variables were constructed, also taking the form of dummies. One 
dummy measured the order between competition and privatisation, which equalled 1 
from privatisation if the country introduced competition before privatising its 
generating capacity. The sequencing between regulation and privatisation was 
measured by another dummy, which similarly took the value of 1 if an independent 
regulator was in place before privatisation and beginning from the year privatisation 
occurred. Only two countries in the data set had introduced regulation followed by 
competition and then privatisation and hence the effects of this sequencing could not 
be statistically investigated. It is possible that there are lagged effects. To reflect this 
the sequencing dummies were also time lagged. 
 
Macroeconomic and demographic variables were included in the estimations as 
environmental controls. They included GDP per capita, the degree of urbanisation 
(urban population as percentage of the total) and the degree of industrialisation (the 
percentage of industrial output as a share of GDP).  These three control variables were 
computed based on data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The 
amount of income per head and the degree of urbanisation and industrialisation in a 
country can be expected to be causal factors in determining the amount of electricity 
generation installed and electricity produced. Richer and more developed and 
urbanised societies use more electricity power per capita. Political and institutional 
factors are also now recognised to be potentially important determinants of economic 
performance differences (North, 1990; Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001; Jalilian et al.,   21
2003; Ruffin, 2003) Countries with protected property rights and sound ‘law and 
order’ can expect to benefit from higher output levels. A further independent variable 
was therefore added to reflect a country’s ‘economic freedom’. The economic 
freedom variable is intended to serve as a proxy for the wider political and 
institutional factors that have been associated with economic performance 
improvements, independent of privatisation, competition and economic regulation, 
such as freedom of exchange with foreigners, level of government spending and 
taxation, legal structure and security of property rights and sound money. This 
variable was based on the 10-point indices published in the Economic Freedom of the 
World: 2002 Annual Report - the higher the score the ‘freer’ or more liberal the 
society.  
 
Table 2 lists the variables used in the study and summary statistics and the usual 
correlation matrix are provided in an Appendix to the paper. The correlation matrix 
shows a high cross-correlation between the competition before privatisation (SCP) 
and regulation before privatisation (SRP) sequencing dummies. This means that 
countries which introduced competition before privatisation were also likely to have 
introduced an industry regulator. However, as the two variables are not included in 
the same regressions the cross-correlation is not a problem. In order to control for 
unobserved country-specific factors, a fixed effects panel model was used.
8 A 
Hausman test was undertaken which rejected the use of a random effects panel data 
model. The results for the Hausman test can be obtained from the authors.  Log-linear 
functional specifications were adopted in the regressions to transform a likely non-
                                                 
8 The unit root test was conducted and the variables in logged passed the test for stationarity.   22
linear relationship between the performance indicators and the explanatory variables 
into a linear one. The regressions took the following forms: 
 
it i it it it it i it v x SRP P R y ε δ β β β α + + + + + + = ) (ln ) ( ) ( ) ( ln 3 2 1                       (1) 
it i it it it it i it e w x SCP b P b C b a y + + ∆ + + + + = ) (ln ) ( ) ( ) ( ln 3 2 1                        (2) 
 
where  it y  is each of the electricity indicators discussed above and listed in Table 2; 
it it it P C R , ,  are the regulation, competition and privatisation dummies respectively; 
it SRP  and  it SCP represent the two sequencing dummies of regulation before 
privatisation  and competition before privatisation, respectively;  it x donates the 
control variables;  i v and  i w are the unit-specific residuals that differ between units but 
remain constant for any particular unit; while  it ε  and  it e  are the remainder of the 
disturbance.  
 
(Table 2 here) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) were estimated for each of the four dependent variables - net 
electricity generation per capita, installed generation capacity per capita, electricity 
generation to average capacity and net generation per employee. The same regressions 
were also run substituting lagged sequencing variables. The control variables included 
varied. In addition to GDP per capita (LGDPP) and economic freedom (LFDOM), the 
degrees of urbanisation and industrialisation (LUB and LIN) were included in the 
regressions for electricity generation per capita and generation capacity per capita 
because of their likely impact on electricity consumption. Also, a large proportion of   23
industrial customers implies a higher potential for co-generation and a more even 
demand for electricity. Holding other factors constant, there would, therefore, be a 
reduction in the need for generation capacity.  
 
It should be noted that the method described so far suffers from a potential problem. 
That is, that the dummy variables for privatisation, competition and regulation may be 
endogenously determined. In other words, privatisation, competition and regulation 
may influence each other, as well as the performance of the electricity sector. For 
example, the very poorly performing generators may be privatised the most quickly 
because governments are keen to dispose of them, while better performing generators 
are sold off more slowly leaving time to introduce prior changes to the regulatory and 
competitive environment. The analysis dealt to some extent with this potential 
problem by including country and year fixed effects. The country fixed effects control 
for country-specific propensities to reform and matters such as institutional quality, 
and year fixed effects control for any general trend in the reform of electricity 
generation. However, the method does not necessarily remove the problem of 
endogeneity, in which case, admittedly, any better performance that is associated with 
regulation or competition reforms before privatisation may not necessarily result from 
these reforms. 
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5.  Results and Discussion 
 
The Main Estimation Results 
Table 3 presents the regression results. The upper half of the table shows the 
estimation results for the sequence of establishing an independent regulator before 
privatisation (equation 1 above). The results for the regressions on introducing 
competition before privatisation are presented in the bottom half of the table (equation 
2 above). For all four performance indicators (columns (1), (2) (3) and (4) in the 
table), the results show that the regulation, privatisation and competition dummies are 
each statistically insignificant. The results for regulation and privatisation are 
consistent with the argument that having a separate regulator or privatisation, on their 
own, is not sufficient to improve performance significantly. Indeed, the privatisation 
and regulation dummies often have a negative sign, suggesting that, on their own, 
privatisation and the introduction of economic regulation might even reduce 
performance. However, given the lack of statistical significance and the low 
coefficient values not much should be read into this result. The coefficient for the 
competition variable is positive, as expected, but again insignificant. The 
insignificance of the competition variable is especially surprising because competition 
is conventionally regarded as a strong agent for efficiency improvement. In summary, 
these results suggest that each of the three reform elements – competition, regulation 
and privatisation - has little impact on allocative efficiency and labour and capital 
productivity in electricity generation in our sample of developing countries.  
 
(Table 3 here.) 
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However, the coefficients of the regulation-privatisation sequencing dummy (SRP) 
are positive and significant at the 5% level in the first two columns. This means that 
establishing an independent regulator before privatising what is likely to be a firm 
with continuing market dominance is more likely to lead to higher electricity 
availability and more generation capacity per capita than failing to do so. Although 
the SRP dummy is positively correlated to the capacity utilisation rate (column (3)), 
the coefficient only has a significance of 12%, just failing the 10% probability test.  
The results for the sequencing between competition and regulation (SCP) in equation 
2 seem robust for the first three performance indicators, with the coefficients being 
positive and significant at the 10% level. Introducing competition before privatisation 
is also associated with improvements in performance compared to when competition 
is not introduced. 
 
The non–significant results for net electricity generation per employee (column (4)) 
are unexpected, given that a downsizing of the labour force is widely believed to 
occur with privatisation or in response to competitive pressures.  One explanation for 
this result may lie in the data used to compute the labour productivity variable. The 
main source of the employment data is the database of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), combined with employee figures in the electricity sector provided 
by the Industrial Statistics Yearbooks. The data from these two sources are not ideal 
in terms of either the coverage of countries or the completeness of the data. In 
addition, the employment figures provided by the ILO include all employees in the 
electricity sector. Since some sample countries have unbundled their electricity 
sectors while others have not, using the data to compute labour productivity in 
electricity generation may give a distorted picture. Also, some of the data from the   26
Industrial Statistics Yearbooks combine the number of employees in the electricity 
sector with those in the water industry. In these cases, assumptions were made about 
the share of the employment in electricity based on the more detailed labour force 
breakdown in the ILO database. These adjustments, necessitated by the lack of 
superior data, make the variable net electricity generation per employee potentially 
less reliable than the other dependent variables used in the regressions. Given this, 
probably the safest interpretation of the labour productivity results is that they are 
inconclusive about the effects of sequencing. The discussion in the following section 
is based mainly on the first three performance indicators. 
 
The control variables conform to expectations, in most cases. The level of income per 
capita, the degree of urbanisation, the share of industrial output  and the measure of 
economic freedom are all positively correlated with the  output and capacity 
performance measures. For labour and capital productivity (columns 3 and 4) only the 
economic freedom control variable and GDP per capita are included in the reported 
regressions because urbanisation and industrialisation are less obviously related to 
productivity. The results for GDP per head are consistent with expectation that a 
higher income leads to more electricity consumption and, in turn, higher labour 
productivity. But the results for the economic freedom variable are either statistically 
insignificant or display an unexpected negative sign. However, as already discussed, 
the labour productivity results may not be reliable because of measurement problems.  
 
To test whether the results are sensitive to lagged effects, the two sequencing 
dummies were time lagged. The SPR dummy then showed a significant and positive 
effect for capacity utilisation when lagged by one year, suggesting, as perhaps to be   27
expected, that electricity capacity adjusts after a short lag. Apart from this result, the 
findings were essentially the same as before. 
 
Discussion 
Although they are not the main focus of this study, the generally negative coefficients 
on the dummies for privatisation and regulation deserve some further comment. Due 
to data restrictions, the regulation dummy was constructed to indicate whether there is 
an independent regulator. But almost no government agency is absolutely independent 
of political control and the degree of independence can be expected to vary across 
countries and over time. Simplifying regulatory policies into a dummy that reflects 
only the declared existence of an independent regulator by government is broad brush 
and was necessitated by data availability. There are weaknesses in the privatisation 
dummy used too, as discussed earlier. Nevertheless, the negative signs on the 
privatisation and regulation dummies across the estimations are consistent with the 
argument that privatised monopolies are still able to restrict output and face 
insufficient incentives to achieve efficiency in the use of capital. In summary, the 
results, while tentative, are consistent with the view that reform in electricity is a 
complicated process and that economic success is unlikely to result from a single 
policy such as privatisation. 
 
The sequencing of reforms is the main focus of this study and the results suggest that 
subjecting generators to competition ahead of privatisation reduces and may even 
remove monopoly incentives to restrict output. The research has also found that the 
establishment ahead of privatisation of an independent regulator reduces monopoly 
effects on output. Evidence in the study is, therefore, consistent with the hypotheses   28
that either introducing competition or establishing an independent regulator before 
privatising electricity generation facilitates the improvement of electricity availability. 
Supporting evidence is also found for the hypotheses regarding the beneficial effects 
of reform sequencing on capacity expansion. The significant and positive association 
between the sequencing dummy of regulation-privatisation suggests that putting a 
regulator in place, in advance of privatisation, provides private investors with more 
confidence to invest and expand capacity. In addition, the evidence on reform 
sequencing and capital productivity confirms a significant positive relationship 
between capacity utilisation and the sequencing dummies of competition-privatisation 
and regulation-privatisation, in particular when the latter is time lagged. Firstly, this is 
consistent with the argument that competition helps eliminate the scope for 
managerial slack, which may still exist if privatisation occurs without the monopoly 
power of incumbents being challenged. Removal of managerial slack leads to higher 
capital productivity. Secondly, it is consistent with the view that having an 
independent electricity regulator before privatising generators brings about benefits in 
terms of capacity utilisation.  
 
Finally, regarding the hypothesised improvement in labour productivity, the results 
are best seen as inconclusive due to data limitations.
9 Nevertheless, in general the 
results for the sequencing dummies imply that the order and timing of reforms 
matters. More benefits in terms of improved economic efficiency can be expected if 
privatisation is undertaken after either competition has been introduced or an 
effective regulatory framework has been put in place. The results for regulation before 
                                                 
9 Fink et al. (2002) in their study of telecommunications contend that alternative sequences of reforms 
will matter for allocative efficiency but not for productive or what they refer to as internal efficiency. 
They postulate that privatising before the introduction of competition simply delays productivity gains. 
However, their argument is not set out in detail and we find that capital productivity in electricity 
generation does respond to sequencing.   29
privatisation complement those in the studies by Wallsten (2002) and Fink et al. 
(2002) of reform sequencing in telecommunications. Wallsten found that countries 
which established separate regulatory bodies prior to privatisation saw more 
investment and greater service penetration than those that did not. Fink et al. reported 
that introducing competition after privatisation led to fewer main lines per population 
than where competition and privatisation were introduced simultaneously. The results 
are also complementary to those in Gutierrez (2003) regarding the importance of 
regulation and competition in determining performance improvement. Table 4 
provides a summary of our results in terms of the two hypotheses set out earlier. 
 
(Table 4 here.) 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Recent research has identified the possible importance of the correct sequencing of 
reforms if economic performance is to improve as intended (for a very recent 
endorsement of this view see World Bank, 2004b, p.8). However, to date there has 
been limited empirical study of the appropriate sequencing of reforms and none, as far 
as we are aware, relating to the electricity sector. This paper has attempted to fill the 
gap using data on electricity generation in 25 developing economies over the period 
from 1985 to 2001. The study has found that having an independent regulator before 
privatising generation is associated with higher electricity availability and more 
generating capacity; and introducing competition before undertaking privatisation in 
electricity generation appears to bring about favourable effects in terms of service   30
penetration, capacity expansion, capacity utilisation and capital productivity. While it 
can be hazardous to leap from correlation to causality, the results do seem to confirm 
that electricity power reform is a complex process and that single reforms, in 
particular privatisation alone, may well disappoint. It does seem that the sequencing 
of reforms or more specifically the order of the introduction of privatisation, 
competition and regulation matters, although much more research is needed before a 
definite conclusion on the appropriate sequencing can be safely promoted to policy 
makers.   
 
Admittedly, the study has a number of deficiencies relating to the sample, data 
availability and endogeneity. As mentioned at the outset of the paper, the sample is a 
sub-set of a larger data base of reforms in electricity in developing economies and 
included only those countries for which we had the necessary data on the timing of 
reforms and where reforms relating to competition or regulation and privatisation 
occurred. It remains unclear whether the results apply to other countries. Also, future 
research could usefully concentrate upon developing more reliable competition, 
regulation and privatisation variables for electricity generation. Our variables are 
broad brush because of data availability. Also, the data on employment resulted in a 
failure to provide insightful evidence on labour productivity. Further efforts could be 
made in the direction of collecting consistent employment data for more countries. 
Turning to endogeneity, although we attempted to address this issue by including 
country and year fixed effects, and even though our results are broadly consistent with 
predictions from the competition, regulation and privatisation literatures, more 









Variable        Mean         Std.Dev.        Minimum         Maximum      
---------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
P         .374117647      .484464532      .000000000      1.00000000        
R         .249411765      .433182478      .000000000      1.00000000         
C         .141176471      .348613872      .000000000      1.00000000         
SRP       .131764706      .338633409      .000000000      1.00000000         
SCP       .0776470588     .267930781      .000000000      1.00000000         
LUB       4.03815327      .385753394      2.88480071      4.60517019         
LIN       3.36869981      .323454464      2.64224265      4.19765297         
LGDPP     .755014482      1.01426854     -1.31420049      3.19889584         










                  P          R          C              SPR         SPC        LUB       LIN     LGDP    LFDOM 
       P       1.0    
       R   .53204      1.0   
       C   .42316   .65149        1.0   
     SRP   .52441   .69463   .51009      1.0    
     SCP   .38875   .51494   .73362   .74131  1.0   
     LUB   .19066   .10641   .24424   .11377   .17908        1.0 
     LIN  -.10337  -.23336  -.06835  -.17615  -.03445     .17722       1.0    
    LGDPP .36282   .10519   .11852   .17658   .01632    .58397   .24280    1.0    
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Table 1: Country Details 
 









Argentina 1992  1991  1992 
Barbados  Before 1985  Before 1985   
Bolivia   1995  1994  1994 
Brazil   1999  1996    
Chile 1987 1982  Before  1987 
Colombia   1996  1994  1995 
Dominican Rep.  1998     
Gabon   1997     
Georgia   1999  1999  1999 
Guatemala   1998    1997 
Hong Kong  Before 1985     
India   1997  1998   
Kazakhstan   1994  1999   
Malaysia   1992    1999 
Morocco   1996     
Nicaragua   2001  1998   
Pakistan   1996  1997   
Panama   1998  1998  1998 
Peru 1995 1993  1993 
Qatar 2000     
Senegal   1999  1999   
South Africa  2001  1995   
Thailand   1995     
Trinidad and Tobago  1998     
Venezuela   1998     
 
Blanks indicate competition or regulation was not introduced before privatisation. 
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Table 2: Description of the Variables 
 
Dependent Variables  
  Net electricity generation per capita (KW/person) 
  Generation capacity per capita (KW/person) 
  Net electricity generation / average installed capacity 
  Net electricity generation per employee (million KW/person) 
  
Reform dummy variables  Description
R Regulation  dummy 
C Competition  dummy 
P  The Dummy of privatisation in the generation sector 
SCP  The sequencing dummy between privatisation and competition 
SRP  The sequencing dummy between privatisation and regulation 
Control variables  Description
LGDPP  Log of GDP per capita (1995 constant US$/person) 
LUB  Log of urban population as a share of the total (%) 
LIN  Log of industrial output as a share of GDP (%) 
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Table 3: The Regression Results 
 Dependent 
        variable 
 
Independent 








































































2 R   .987 .967  .990  .839 
F test  559.60 216.45  768.70  22.02 














374 374  374  189 




















































2 R   .988 .967  .990  .841 
F test  619.06 213.31  426.31  22.28 














374 374  374  189 
For the key to the independent variables, see Table 1. 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.   35
 
 
Table 4: Summary of the Research Results 
 
 
H y p o t h e s i s         R e s u l t s  
 
Hypothesis 1: 
Establishing an independent regulator prior to      
privatising electricity generators will yield a  
greater improvement in: 
  
output          Not  Rejected 
                    
generating capacity       Not  rejected 
 
capacity utilisation          Not rejected (when lagged  
                  effect  included) 
  






Introducing competition prior to privatising  
electricity generators will yield a greater 
improvement in: 
 
output        Not  rejected 
 
generating capacity       Not  rejected 
 
capacity  utilisation      Not  rejected 
 
labour  productivity      Inconclusive 
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